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INTRODUCTION
Karl Llewellyn famously observed that, for every canon of statutory
construction, another canon points in the opposite direction.' Duel-
ing canons potentially invite judicial manipulation of statutes, as
judges can simply pluck a desired canon to support a desired reading
of a statute.
But can this problem occur even when judges are deciding
whether or not to invoke only one canon in a given case? Surpris-
ingly, in the case of the avoidance canon, it can. After the Supreme
S 2
Court's recent ruling in Clark v. Martinez, three different interpretive
methods now fall under the umbrella of "the avoidance canon." In
any particular case, each counsels different outcomes, facilitating po-
tential judicial sleight of hand whenever judges putatively invoke "the
avoidance canon."
To highlight this problem, suppose Congress enacts the following
statute:
The federal government's termination of an employee of an
agency is unlawful, unless:
(1) the employee has been convicted of a felony; or
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1 Examples include: "If language is plain and unambiguous it must be given effect," yet an
opposing canon states, "[n]ot when literal interpretation would ... thwart manifest pur-
pose." Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 403 (1950).
2 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
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(2) because of the employee's sexual orientation, termination is
determined to be advisable in the interests of the United
States.
Suppose that Jones, an unpaid college intern working for the State
Department, is convicted of a felony and then terminated. The dif-
ferent versions of the avoidance canon that have emerged provide
different answers as to whether Jones can challenge his termination
under the statute.
Call the earliest version, set forth by Justice Brandeis, the "Serious
Constitutional Doubts Canon":
"When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a car-
dinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a con-
struction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided.",
3
Under this Canon, Jones's case is straightforward. Under the natural
reading of the statute, Jones is certainly an "employee," and termina-
tion due to a felony conviction is constitutionally uncontroversial.
Without "serious constitutional doubts" present, the Serious Constitu-
tional Doubts Canon counsels against deviating from the natural
reading of the statute.
Call a second version, later articulated by Chief Justice Burger, the
"Clear Affirmative Intention Canon":
The Court must avoid "serious constitutional questions,"4 unless
"the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed, 5
mandates reaching these questions.
Jones's case also appears to be reasonably straightforward under this
Canon. Assuming termination of felons does not raise "serious con-
stitutional questions," a judge need not determine whether Congress
clearly intended to raise these questions. Thus, similar to the Serious
Constitutional Doubts Canon, the Clear Affirmative Intention Canon
also counsels against searching for a different construction of the
statute, even if for somewhat different reasons.
ButJones's case becomes vastly more complicated under the most
recent version of the avoidance canon. Call this formulation, ush-
ered in by Justice Scalia in the 2005 Term's Clark v. Martinez deci-
sion,6 the "Lowest Common Denominator Canon":
3 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
4 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979).
5 Id.
6 543 U.S. at 371.
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"[W] hen deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions
to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its
choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional
problems, the other should prevail-whether or not those consti-
tutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before the
Court. ,
7
Justice Scalia's justification for this Canon provides the "Lowest
Common Denominator" moniker: "It is not at all unusual to give a
statute's ambiguous language a limiting construction called for by
one of the statute's applications, even though other of the statute's
applications, standing alone, would not support the same limitation.
The lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern.,8
Jones's case becomes more complicated precisely because he is
not the lowest common denominator. Instead, Jones might point at
Smith, a hypothetical litigant who is also an unpaid college intern
working for the State Department. Smith, however, is terminated af-
ter the State Department determines that his homosexuality poses a
threat to national security.9
But unlike Jones, Smith's termination under the statute does pose
apparent constitutional doubts. Termination because of sexual ori-
entation triggers some level of heightened scrutiny, even if the pre-
cise level is unclear. 1 Some terminations determined to be "advis-
able in the interests of the United States" might satisfy this level of
scrutiny, but some almost certainly do not.
Under the Lowest Common Denominator Canon, the constitu-
tional doubts in Smith's case dictate searching for other plausible
statutory interpretations that avoid these problems. One solution is
to interpret the term "employee" narrowly, excluding unpaid college
interns." Doing so preserves within the statute's coverage a core set
7 Id. at 380-81.
8 Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
9 These facts are similar to those of Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988), where the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency terminated a homosexual employee under a statute al-
lowing the Director, "in his discretion," to terminate any employee "whenever he shall
deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States ....
See id. at 594 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (holding that the criminal pro-
hibition of homosexual sodomy violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of lib-
erty); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996) (holding that a state constitutional
amendment preventing governmental action to protect homosexuals from discrimination
violated the Equal Protection Clause).
11 In fact, much controversy exists over when to classify volunteers as bona fide employees.
See generally, e.g., MarthaJ. Schoonover et al., Immigration Law: Basics and More, 10 A.L.I. -
A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 1, 9 (2006) (noting that the Immigration and Naturali-
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of employees (e.g., high-level, at-will agency officials), where termina-
tion of homosexuals might still satisfy constitutional scrutiny.
Excluding Smith through this alternative construction also dic-
tates excludingJones, even thoughJones's felony conviction poses no
constitutional problems, and Congress's intent to cover Jones's ter-
mination is evident. This outcome exposes the following crucial dis-
tinction: of the three versions of the avoidance canon, only the Low-
est Common Denominator Canon dictates reading Jones out of the
statute, despite the obvious lack of constitutional problems regarding
his termination.
This cleavage of the avoidance canon into three interpretive
methods was hardly foreseeable. After all, the canon fundamentally
derives from a single, age-old principle of judicial restraint-that
courts should avoid deciding constitutional issues unless necessary.
As Justice Brandeis famously stated, "[t] he Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of.' 12 The marriage of this judicial restraint principle and
the avoidance canon explains the canon's intuitive appeal 13 and long-
standing usage by the Supreme Court. 14  Thus, the Court has de-
clared that the canon "has for so long been applied by this Court that
it is beyond debate."'15 And other commentators have described the
avoidance canon as "[p]robably the most important of the constitu-
tionally based canons...."'6
zation Service promulgated a regulation exempting volunteers from the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986's definition of "employees").
12 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,J., concurring).
13 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRiCKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETr, LEGISLATION
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 349 (2000) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL.,
LEGISLATION] (noting the "strong superficial appeal" of the avoidance canon).
14 See, e.g., Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800) (interpreting the Judiciary
Act of 1789 narrowly, as statutes must "receive a construction, consistent with the consti-
tution"); cf Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Mar-
shall, C.J.) ("It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be con-
strued to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and
consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights... further than is war-
ranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.").
15 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1968).
16 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 599 (1992).
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If anything, the trifurcation of the avoidance canon is ironic,
given the recent trend towards textualism17 and its accompanying
criticism that the canon, "in the hands of lazy or willful judges might
provide little barrier to truly implausible attributions of statutory
meaning."1 8 After all, the Lowest Common Denominator Canon is
also the only formulation that dictates reading Jones out of the stat-
ute, despite the statute's plain text.
This Comment argues that the Lowest Common Denominator
Canon creates an avoidance canon "grab bag," where-as demon-
strated in the Jones example-judges can resort to different formula-
tions of the canon to justify both adherence to, and departure from,
the natural reading of virtually any statute. Part I surveys the norma-
tive justifications for, and criticisms of, the avoidance canon, conclud-
ing that general agreement exists concerning the need to protect
against overaggressive use of the canon. Proceeding on the assump-
tion that overaggressive use of the canon is undesirable, Part II com-
pares the susceptibility of the three canons to overaggressive usage.
This Part argues that, by using statutory ambiguity as a "trigger" for
potential avoidance canon usage, the Lowest Common Denominator
Canon is the most susceptible to overaggressive usage, as courts can
perceive ambiguity in virtually any statute. Part III assesses the con-
tinuing vitality of all three Canons in the lower courts, concluding
that the shortcomings of the Lowest Common Denominator Canon
have resulted in a state of disarray where the three Canons have been
deployed in unpredictable ways.
I. WHY HAVE THE AVOIDANCE CANON?
A. The Justifications for the Avoidance Canon
Textual canons of statutory interpretation (e.g., "interpret a gen-
eral term to be similar to more specific terms in a series") 9 are typi-
17 See generally ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION, supra note 13, at 223-36 (discussing the
rise of textualist theories including Justice Scalia's so-called "new textualism"); Jonathan
T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing the end
of the textualist revolution and the convergence of textualist views with other moderate
theories of statutory interpretation); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347
(2005) (exploring the distinctions between textualism and other theories of statutory in-
terpretation, such as intentionalism).
18 ESKRIDGE,JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION, supra note 13, at 350.
19 Id. at 375.
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cally thought of as "guidelines for evaluating linguistic or syntactic
meaning.,
20
The avoidance canon, however, is a substantive canon of interpre-
tation." Substantive canons are distinct from textual canons, as the
former "are rooted in broader policy or value judgments"2 2 and "at-
tempt to harmonize statutory meaning with policies rooted in the
common law... or the Constitution., 23  The justifications for the
avoidance canon, then, typically focus on the underlying values the
24canon serves.
According to conventional accounts, the avoidance canon serves
judicial restraint values. 5 Central to these values is respect for legisla-
tive supremacy and the corresponding fear that 'Judicial review is a
counter-majoritarian force in our system. 26 When Congress enacts a
statute, its members, who swear to uphold the Constitution, are pre-
sumed to be legislating within constitutional limits. 27 Invalidating a
statute, on the other hand, defeats legislative will and "is the gravest
and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform. ,2 8 The
avoidance canon allows courts to refrain from striking down statutes
20 Id. at 329.
21 Id. at 348.
22 Id. at 330.
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1189, 1202 (2006) (aiming to "identify those values" the avoidance canon "oper-
ates in service of").
25 See generally id. at 1202-08 (chronicling such accounts).
26 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962). Some would go even further,
claiming that the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review derives from its lack of
clear constitutional authorization. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 71, 71-72.
27 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) ("This canon is followed out of respect
for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional limitations." (citing
FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-07 (1924))). Some commentators note that
this presumption does not extend to the belief that Congress also intends to avoid serious
constitutional doubts when legislating. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 24, at 1207 (con-
tending that "the most historically accurate account of the move from classical avoidance
to the judicial restraint theory of modern avoidance does not include a presumption of
congressional intent to avoid constitutional doubts"). But cf Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S.
371, 381 (2005) (describing the avoidance canon as "a tool for choosing between compet-
ing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption
that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts").
28 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring in the judgment of
an equally divided Court).
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full stop, functioning as "a means of giving effect to congressional in-
tent, not of subverting it."2 9
Additionally, by enabling the judiciary to avert inherently difficult
constitutional issues when possible, the avoidance canon serves an-
other pragmatic dimension of judicial restraint.3 0  Constitutional ad-
judication is frequently difficult, requiring "elaborate doctrines and
tests that go well beyond anything that can be mechanically gleaned
from constitutional text."' Unnecessary constitutional adjudication
risks ossifying ill-thought-out standards that legislatures and even fed-
eral courts are hard pressed to undo. These concerns help situate
the avoidance canon among more familiar judicial restraint princi-
ples, such as standing doctrines" and narrow holdings to decide
33cases.
Distinct from the judicial restraint theories above, more recent
justifications for the avoidance canon focus on what Trevor Morrison
calls "constitutional enforcement" values.34  Under this theory, the
judiciary "giv[es] voice to constitutional norms that are real, not
phantoms, and that are generally left underenforced by more con-
ventional types of doctrines. ,'' Thus, usage of the canon "raise [s] ob-
29 Martinez, 543 U.S. at 382; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 336 (2001) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("The doctrine of constitutional doubt is meant to effectuate, not to subvert,
congressional intent, by giving ambiguous provisions a meaning that will avoid constitu-
tional peril, and that will conform with Congress's presumed intent not to enact measures
of dubious validity.").
30 See ESKRIDGE,JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION, supra note 13, at 348 ("Even ifjudicial review is con-
sidered a well-settled and legitimate practice, the Court's constitutional decisions raise
several practical legal process issues relating to the comparative institutional competence
of courts and legislatures.").
31 Id. at 349.
32 See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-46 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) ("The Court has ... restricted exercise of Uudicial review] by rigid insistence that
the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to actual cases and controversies; and that they
have no power to give advisory opinions."); see also Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary
Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REv. 847, 847 (2005) ("One of the oldest principles of
constitutional adjudication is that federal courts will decide only those constitutional
questions that are necessary to the resolution of cases or controversies. This principle
provides a key justification for judicial review and underlies much of the law ofjusticiabil-
ity.").
33 See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not formulate a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
34 Morrison, supra note 24, at 1212.
35 Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial
Review, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1549, 1585 (2000); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 286 (1994) (describing the avoidance canon as a "subconsti-
tutional way to enforce 'underenforced' constitutional norms").
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stacles to particular governmental actions without barring those ac-
tions entirely, 36 ultimately "forc[ing] legislators to reflect and delib-
erate before plunging into constitutionally sensitive issues., 3' When
viewed this way, the avoidance canon amounts to a "clear statement
principle,"8 closely resembling the Clear Affirmative Intention
Canon. 9
Constitutional enforcement justifications also emerged in re-
sponse to the canon's main criticisms, that the canon facilitates crea-
tive readings of statutes and fails to serve its underlying judicial re-
straint values. Constitutional enforcement justifications attempt to
insulate the canon from these criticisms, reasoning that "if the aim of
avoidance is to protect constitutional values... then its failure to
track congressional intent is largely irrelevant."40 This Comment now
turns to criticisms of the avoidance canon.
B. The Criticisms of the Avoidance Canon
Because the avoidance canon only makes a difference when a
court uses it to deviate from the otherwise-preferred reading of a
41statute, criticisms of the avoidance canon center on lack of fidelity
to a statute's plain meaning. By deviating from a statute's natural
reading, "the Court... interprets a statute in ways that its drafters did
not anticipate, and, constitutional questions aside, in ways that its
drafters may not have preferred. 42  Even more cynically, the avoid-
ance canon potentially becomes "a slippery requirement that in the
hands of lazy or willful judges might provide little barrier to truly im-
plausible attributions of statutory meaning.
43
36 Young, supra note 35, at 1585.
37 ESKRIDGE,JR., supra note 35, at 286.
38 STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS,
TEXT, AND CASES 327 (6th ed. 2006). For a more detailed discussion of the distinction be-
tween the avoidance canon and clear statement rules, see infra note 139.
39 See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
40 Morrison, supra note 25, at 1212-13.
41 See Schauer, supra note 26, at 83 ("In almost any case we can imagine, the constitution-
free principles of statutory interpretation will likely favor one result over another."); see
alsoYoung, supra note 35, at 1577 ("[E]ven statutes that are sufficiently unclear to trigger
the avoidance canon will have a 'lean' to them-a meaning which would be more persua-
sive than the alternatives if no further considerations were introduced.").
42 Schauer, supra note 26, at 74.
43 ESKRIDGE,JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION, supra note 13, at 350. See generallyJames J. Brudney &
Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND.
L. REV. 1 (2005) (using an empirical study to contend that liberal Justices' usage of all
textual and substantive canons correlates with liberal outcomes and vice versa for conser-
vative Justices).
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Moreover, legislators might even prefer that courts address the
constitutional merits of their statutes. Congress, after all, typically in-
serts severability clauses, allowing for constitutionally valid provisions
to be severed from invalid provisions. 4 Consistent with this view,
Judge Friendly argued that:
[T] here is always the chance .. that the doubts will be settled favorably,
and if they are not, the conceded rule of construing to avoid unconstitu-
tionality will come into operation and save the day. People in such a
45
heads-I-win, tails-you-lose position do not readily sacrifice it ....
Thus, legislators might prefer that courts confront constitutional is-
sues head on, especially when courts still have the option of interpret-
ing the statute differently if the natural reading actually violates the
Constitution." This criticism flourishes in light of case law "rife with
constitutional questions that the Court has avoided by construction,
only later to hold, when forced to confront the question under a dif-
ferent statute, that the constitutional claim should not prevail."
47
A final group of criticisms focuses less on respect for legislative in-
tent and more on judicial craft, maintaining that the canon overpro-
tects constitutional norms through unnecessary making of constitu-
tional law.4  Judge Posner has argued that the avoidance canon
44 Eg., Young, supra note 35, at 1580.
45 Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, reprinted in HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 196, 210 (1967).
46 This argument implicates a distinction between the three formulations of the canon and
a fourth version, "classical avoidance," which predates the three variants discussed here.
See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) (distin-
guishing between "classical avoidance" and "modern avoidance"). Classical avoidance
provides that "as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it
would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, [a court's] plain duty is to adopt that
which will save the Act." Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., con-
curring in the judgment of an equally divided Court). The difference between classical
avoidance and its three modem variants lies in whether the statutory construction at issue
is actually unconstitutional or merely poses some risk of unconstitutionality. See Morri-
son, supra note 24, at 1203. Because commentators generally agree that the Supreme
Court shifted away from classical avoidance early in the twentieth century, see, e.g., id. at
1204 (citing United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366
(1909)), this Comment will focus only on the three modem formulations of the avoid-
ance canon.
47 Vermeule, supra note 46, at 1960; see also RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS
AND REFORM 284-85 (1985) (arguing that use of the canon prevents potentially constitu-
tional readings of a statute, as the otherwise-preferred reading might ultimately withstand
constitutional scrutiny).
48 See Schauer, supra note 26, at 87 ("[T]he Court will [use the avoidance canon to] sup-
plant the otherwise-best result only when it believes that there is a serious or substantial
constitutional question involved. Yet this determination is itself a confrontation with the
very issue that Ashwanderseeks to avoid.").
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creates a 'judge-made constitutional 'penumbra' that has much the
same prohibitory effect as the... Constitution itself."49  A practical
consequence of overprotection is potentially sloppy judicial analysis
of constitutional issues, muddying the waters when a later court must
address these same heretofore-avoided issues. °
With these critiques in mind, critics have clamored for wholesale
abandonment of the avoidance canon, 5' a goal which-if the Lowest
Common Denominator Canon is any indication-will not come to
fruition. Instead, these criticisms have resulted in the following un-
easy compromise: an ongoing tug of war between avoidance of con-
stitutional issues and fidelity to congressional intent.52  The Court's
rhetoric bears this point out in the oft-quoted admonition that " [w] e
cannot press statutory construction 'to the point of disingenuous eva-
sion' even to avoid a constitutional question.''53 This Comment as-
sumes the desirability of charting a middle course between avoidance
of constitutional issues and fidelity to legislative intent, and evaluates
each of the three variants of the avoidance canon in light of this cri-
terion.
II. THE THREE AVOIDANCE CANONS
Canons of statutory interpretation are often treated as weapons to
be deployed in wars over competing interpretations of a statute.-4
49 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI.
L. REv. 800, 816 (1983).
50 See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION, supra note 13, at 351 ("Indeed, perhaps the only
practical difference between invalidating the statute as unconstitutional and imaginatively
interpreting it canonically is that in the latter instance the court may well do a slipshod
job of constitutional analysis, failing to think through the constitutional issues because,
after all, it is supposedly avoiding them."). Ernest Young has suggested two examples of
constitutional analysis "sketchier than one might have expected had the Court actually
had to resolve those claims on the merits." Young, supra note 35, at 1583 n.180 (citing
the two paragraphs of constitutional analysis in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1988), and the three pages
of constitutional analysis in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501-04
(1979)).
51 E.g., Emily Sherwin, Rules and Judicial Review, 6 LEGAL THEORY 299, 321 (2000).
52 Recall that one core argument in favor of the avoidance canon is the ability to honor leg-
islative intent, at least in part, without having to invalidate a statute in its entirety. See su-
pra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (quoting United States v. Locke, 471
U.S. 84, 96 (1985) (quoting George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379
(1933) (Cardozo,J.))).
54 See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION, supra note 13, at 348 ("Does the U.S. Supreme
Court or state high courts deploy lucid canons, or are their weapons loose canons in-
stead?").
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Consistent with this theme, each of the three Canons presents differ-
ent opportunities for judicial manipulation, despite their largely simi-
lar language. This Part compares each Canon's susceptibility to judi-
cial manipulation by: (1) breaking each Canon down into a series of
different questions courts must answer in determining whether to in-
voke a particular Canon; and (2) assessing the extent to which these
individual questions invite potential judicial manipulation.
A. The Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon
The earliest of the three Canons, the Serious Constitutional
Doubts Canon, is ultimately the simplest for courts to use. Recall that
this formulation counsels that:
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal princi-
ple that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the stat-
ute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided. 55
The analytical structure of this Canon contains the following implicit
questions:
(1) Does the otherwise-preferred reading of a statute (i.e., the
reading supported by the constitution-free principles of statu-
tory interpretation) raise "serious constitutional doubts" when
applied to the facts of the instant case?56 If not, a court may
stop here; the court may address the merits of whatever non-
serious constitutional doubts are presented by the preferred
reading of the statute.
(2) But if the otherwise-preferred reading of a statute raises "seri-
ous constitutional doubts," is an alternative, saving construc-
tion of the statute "fairly possible"? If the alternative interpre-
tation is "fairly possible," then a court may adopt this
alternative interpretation. If not, the court must assess the
constitutionality of the preferred reading of the statute, as
applied to the facts of the case.5 7
55 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
56 Question (1)'s inquiry would be different in the case of a facial challenge. In a typical
facial challenge, a court would have to resolve whether the otherwise-preferred reading of
a statute raised "serious constitutional doubts," where "no set of circumstances exists un-
der which" this interpretation would be valid. Cf., e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 745 (1987).
57 One might wonder whether these two questions are commutative, i.e., whether one might
refuse to invoke the avoidance canon without evaluating the level of constitutional doubts
at play by concluding that, at any rate, alternative readings of the statute are not "fairly
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These implicit questions create two opportunities for overaggressive
use of the avoidance canon, as courts may either: (1) overstate the
seriousness of the constitutional doubts at play; or (2) resort to "truly
implausible attributions of statutory meaning""8 that are not "fairly
possible" in an effort to avoid "serious constitutional doubts." This
Subpart addresses the extent to which each is problematic.
1. "Serious Constitutional Doubts"
Assessing the severity of constitutional doubts is, at minimum, an
inherently judgment-call-driven exercise. At worst, it is a license for
judicial disingenuousness. But despite well-chronicled fears that the
avoidance canon leads to strained readings of statutes, 9 the most con-
troversial avoidance canon cases involved situations where the Court
actually downplayed the severity of the constitutional doubts at play.
Thus, the Court did not use the avoidance canon when perhaps it
could have. Two examples in this vein are Rust v. Sullivan60 and Al-
mendarez-Torres v. United States.6'
In Rust, the statute provided funding for family planning services,
but not for "programs where abortion is a method of family plan-
ning., 12  Under this statute, the Department of Health and Human
Services promulgated regulations prohibiting funding of programs
that advocated abortion or counseled pregnant mothers about abor-
tion.6 s Here, the avoidance canon issue was whether these regula-
tions raised sufficiently serious constitutional doubts, so as not to be
permissible constructions of the funding statute.
64
possible." The Supreme Court has treated these questions as commutative, at least in
situations where the constitutional doubts did not appear to be serious. See infra note 81
and accompanying text.
58 ESKRIDGE,JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION, supra note 13, at 350.
59 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
60 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
61 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
62 Rust, 500 U.S. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6).
63 See id. at 179-80 (noting that the regulations expressly excluded "pregnancy care (includ-
ing obstetric or prenatal care)," and mandated that programs must refer pregnant clients
by "furnishing a list of available providers that promote the welfare of mother and un-
born child").
64 Id. at 183. Because the case concerns an administrative agency's interpretation of an or-
ganic statute, Rust raises the additional complication of deference to agency interpreta-
tions. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). These added complications are largely beyond the scope of this Comment. For a
more detailed analysis of these issues, see generally, for example,Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms,
Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation,
57 ADMIN. L. REv. 501 (2005). A second complication in Rust's avoidance canon analysis
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When appraising the level of constitutional doubts involved, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-Justice majority, concluded:
"While we do not think that the constitutional arguments... are
without some force .... [T] he regulations ... do not raise the sort of
'grave and doubtful constitutional questions,' that would lead us to
assume Congress did not intend to authorize their issuance."6' The
Court then addressed the merits of the constitutional challenges,
concluding that the statute did not constitute impermissible view-
point discrimination under the First Amendment; the government
simply chose not to subsidize activity relating to the exercise of a fun-
damental right.66 Similarly, the statute did not raise serious doubts
regarding Fifth Amendment due process concerns, as "the Due Proc-
ess Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or prop-
erty interests of which the government itself may not deprive the in-
dividual. 
'67
Where the Chief Justice saw little constitutional doubt, all four
dissenting Justices invoked the Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon
to conclude that the regulations were an impermissible construction
of the funding statute. Justice O'Connor wrote: "In these cases, we
need only tell the Secretary that his regulations are not a reasonable
interpretation of the statute .... If we rule solely on statutory
grounds, Congress retains the power to force the constitutional ques-
tion by legislating more explicitly. '' 6  Before engaging the constitu-
tional arguments on the merits, 69 Justice Blackmun wrote: "[The ma-
jority's] facile response to the intractable problem the Court
addresses today is disingenuous at best. Whether or not one believes
that these regulations are valid, it avoids reality to contend that they
do not give rise to serious constitutional questions."70  These acute
disagreements demonstrate that the main flashpoint in applying the
is the fact that it is evaluating a facial challenge. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 183 (citing United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also supra note 56.
65 Rust, 500 U.S. at 191 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co.,
213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
66 See id. at 193.
67 Id. at 201 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989)).
68 Id. at 224 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
69 See generally id. at 207-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the regulations violated
both the First and Fifth Amendments).
70 Id. at 205.
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Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon is determining what in fact
counts as serious constitutional doubts.
71
Similarly dramatic conflicts resurfaced in Almendarez-Torres v.
United States." Here, the Court addressed a statute concerning once-
deported aliens illegally found in the United States. Whether an
alien's initial "deportation was subsequent to a conviction for com-
mission of an aggravated felony"13 determines whether his maximum
74term of imprisonment is twenty years or only two years. The issue in
this case was whether this provision defined a separate criminal of-
fense, which an indictment must mention, or whether this provision
is a penalty provision that authorizes an enhanced sentence if the of-
fender happens to have been convicted of an aggravated felony.
75
Concluding that the statute is a penalty provision that authorizes in-
creased sentences, the Court upheld Almendarez-Torres's sentence
of eighty-five months' imprisonment, even though his indictment did
not mention earlier aggravated felony convictions.76
Notably, the Court dismissed calls to interpret the statute as set-
ting forth a separate crime, reasoning that the statute did "not lead a
majority gravely to doubt that the statute is constitutional."7 7 As in
Rust, the issue of serious constitutional doubts produced a 54 split
here.
Striking, though, was the vigorous dissent of Justice Scalia, once a
member of the Rust majority,7 1 who now believed that serious consti-
71 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Counter-
majoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 872-73 (1997) ("Until these debates are re-
solved, the scope of the 'serious constitutional doubts' doctrine will remain unclear.
Rather than resolve the uncertainty, Rust only deepens it."). But cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543
U.S. 371, 400 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contending that, if anything, a "disturbing
number" of cases exist where the Court "applied the canon of constitutional doubt to
statutes that were on their face clear" (citing Pub. Citizen v. Dept. ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440,
481-82 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment), and Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181,
212-13 (1985) (White,J., concurring in result))).
72 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
73 Id. at 226 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2)).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 226-27.
77 Id. at 239 (citing, inter alia, Rustv. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991)).
78 Some commentators viewJustice Scalia's position here as ironic. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE,JR. ET
AL., LEGISLATION, supra note 13, at 350 ("Even Justice Scalia-whom one would expect to
be dubious about any canon encouraging a court to deviate from the best textual reading
of a statute-recently chided the majority of his colleagues for refusing to apply the
canon because they believed ... the statute [was] not sufficiently ambiguous."). This
irony is perhaps heightened by the increased likelihood of Justice Scalia's Lowest Corn-
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tutional doubts existed. Justice Scalia argued that if a conviction
need not be included in a criminal indictment, a judge-and not a
jury-could find that the alien had an aggravated felony conviction.
Allowing drastically increased sentences without allowing for the right
to jury trial potentially violates due process, warranting a search for
an alternative construction of the statute .
Rust and Almendarez-Torres exemplify the judgment calls inherent
in courts' application of Question (1) of the Serious Constitutional
Doubts Canon. If anything, these cases demonstrate that the Court is
more likely to understate the level of constitutional doubts in close
cases. Thus, despite concerns that judges use the avoidance canon as
a pretext for manipulating the readings of statutes, Rust and Almen-
darez-Torres are noteworthy instances where the Court refrained from
using the avoidance canon, even though it plausibly could have.
2. "Fairly Possible" Alternative Statutory Interpretations
Potential underusage of the avoidance canon also surfaces when
assessing Question (2), whether an alternative reading, which does
not raise serious constitutional doubts, is "fairly possible." An exami-
nation of the Court's jurisprudence on this question yields two obser-
vations.
First, when the Court finds that a statute's constitutional doubts
are not sufficiently serious, the Court also tends to find that an alter-
nate reading of the statute is not fairly possible. In Almendarez-Torres,
the majority and minority disagreed on both the level of constitu-
tional doubts at play, and whether alternative readings were fairly
possible. 89
Second, when petitioners raise constitutional challenges to a stat-
ute, the Court sometimes disposes of its avoidance canon analysis
without appraising the seriousness of the constitutional doubts at
play. Instead, the Court simply concludes that, at any rate, an alter-
nate construction of the statute is not fairly possible before reaching
81the merits of the constitutional issues.
mon Denominator Canon resulting in departures from the natural reading of a statute.
See infra Part II.C.3.
79 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 251 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80 See id. at 238 (majority opinion) ("[T]he statute must be genuinely susceptible to two con-
structions after, and not before, its complexities are unraveled.... Unlike the dissent, we
do not believe these conditions are met in the present case.").
81 See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611 (1989) (disposing of the petitioner's
avoidance canon argument in one paragraph by concluding that "[h]ere, the language is
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The Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon contains two implicit
questions. If anything, these questions have functioned as barriers
limiting avoidance canon usage, particularly when other Justices re-
garded the preferred interpretation as posing serious constitutional
doubts or even as being outright unconstitutional. Less aggressive
usage of the Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon lies in stark con-
trast to the potentially overaggressive usage of the Clear Affirmative
Intention and Lowest Common Denominator Canons.
B. The Clear Affirmative Intention Canon
When compared to the Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon, the
Clear Affirmative Intention Canon allows greater opportunities for
judicial manipulation. These opportunities become apparent when
examining the Clear Affirmative Intention Canon's analytical struc-
ture. Recall that this version states:
The Court must avoid "serious constitutional questions,"' 2 unless
"the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed
'"8 3
mandates reaching these questions.
Inherent in this version are the following questions:
(1) Has Congress "clearly expressed" an "affirmative intention" to
adopt an otherwise-preferred interpretation that implicates
constitutional questions? If the answer is yes, the court must
reach these questions.
(2) If the requisite "clear expression of an affirmative intention"
to adopt the otherwise-preferred interpretation is not present,
are the constitutional questions "serious?" If yes, the court
must find an alternative interpretation of the statute, which
does not implicate these "serious constitutional questions,"
and is also not "plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." 4
Comparing these questions with those implicit in the Serious Consti-
tutional Doubts Canon reveals two key differences.
clear and the statute comprehensive"); see also United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96
(1985) (disposing of an avoidance canon issue in one sentence: "We cannot press statu-
tory construction 'to the point of disingenuous evasion' even to avoid a constitutional
question" (quoting George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933) (Car-
dozoJ.))).
82 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979).
83 Id.
84 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (citing Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 499-501, 504). It is worth noting that
Catholic Bishop does not itself employ the "plainly contrary" language.
[Vol. 10:1
AVOIDANCE CANONS AFFER CLARK V. MARTINEZ
First, Question (2) of the Clear Affirmative Intention Canon
merely requires "serious constitutional questions," whereas Ques-
tion (1) of the Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon requires "serious
constitutional doubts." On its face, this slight distinction lowers the
threshold for using the avoidance canon.85
Second, and more importantly, the initial "triggers" for when a
statute might be eligible for avoidance canon treatment are funda-
mentally different in kind. The Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon
typically begins with an examination of the level of constitutional
doubts at play. But the Clear Affirmative Intention Canon begins
with an examination of the level of clarity in the statute instead. By
requiring a clear affirmative intention, this Canon begins to resemble
an "extraordinarily strong presumption, amounting to a clear state-
ment rule . 5..."86 After all, rarely do statutes demonstrate a clear af-
firmative intention, 7 rendering almost any statute eligible for avoid-
ance canon treatment.
A case in point is the statute in National Labor Relations Board v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago,ss the case setting forth the Clear Affirmative
Intention Canon. Here, the Court contemplated the constitutionality
of a statute, providing the Board jurisdiction over
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but
shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government
corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdi-
vision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as
amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when
acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or
agent of such labor organization.
Before the Court were two related questions: (1) does the statute's
definition of "employer" confer jurisdiction over church-operated
schools, attended by both religious and secular students; and (2) if
such jurisdiction exists, does the statute violate the First Amend-
85 See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION, supra note 13, at 354 ("If a 'serious constitutional
question' is merely one that gives headaches to law students (even if it has a relatively
clear answer if thought through carefully), this canon could be invoked in many cases
even though the constitutionality of the statute, fairly interpreted, is not in much
doubt.").
86 Id.
87 See id. ("More important, a search for an 'affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed' seems to be satisfied only by express statutory language or crystal-clear legisla-
tive history.").
88 440 U.S. at 490.
89 Id. at 511 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)).
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ment's Religion Clauses by mandating that these schools engage in
collective bargaining with teacher unions?9°
Using the Clear Affirmative Intention Canon, the Court avoided
the second question by holding that the statute's definition of "em-
ployer" did not cover church-operated schools, even though none of
the statute's eight expressly defined exceptions involved schools at
all. And the Court found "no clear expression of an affirmative in-
tention of Congress that teachers in church-operated schools should
be covered by the Act,"9' even though-under familiar principles of
expressio unius9 -failure to exempt these schools suggested Con-
gress's intent not to exclude them. (One might suppose that Con-
gress could have demonstrated a clear affirmative intention by un-
usually defining "employees" as: "Any person acting as an agent of an
employer, including church-operated schools, but not including any of
the following exceptions.")
By contrast, Justice Brennan's dissent accused the majority of dis-
regarding the limitations of the Serious Constitutional Doubts
Canon, thereby distorting the labor statute beyond recognition.
93
Because the statute in no way mentioned exempting church-operated
schools, reading in such an exemption anyway is not a "fairly possi-
ble" interpretation of the statute, as the older Canon requires.94 Un-
der Justice Brennan's analysis, the Court had no choice but to ad-
dress the constitutionality of the statute's application to church-
operated schools.
95
The conflict in Catholic Bishop illustrates the key contrast between
the Serious Constitutional Doubts and Clear Affirmative Intention
Canons: rather than using a statute's clarity to forestall attempts to
manipulate it-as the Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon's "fairly
possible" limitation does-the Clear Affirmative Intention Canon
demands manipulation in the absence of crystal clarity. If fidelity to
legislative intent is important, the statutory text is supposed to "act[]
90 Id. at 491, 495 (majority opinion).
91 Id. at 504.
92 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (noting that "the canon
expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has
force only when the items expressed are members of an 'associated group or series,' justi-
fying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not in-
advertence.").
93 See generally Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 509-18 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
94 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 3.
95 See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Under my view that the
[statute] includes within its coverage lay teachers employed by church-operated schools,
the constitutional questions presented would have to be reached.").
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as a brake against wholesale judicial dismemberment of congressional
enactments., 96 It is not to lie in wait as an almost-always-ready trigger
countenancing judicial manipulation of its language.
This problem exists despite the requirement that alternative con-
structions not be "plainly contrary to the intent of Congress," 97 a limi-
tation noticeably more elastic than the Serious Constitutional Doubts
Canon's "fairly possible" constructions limitation. 98  Ultimately, the
differences between the Serious Constitutional Doubts and Clear Af-
firmative Intention Canons show why the latter provides greater op-
portunities for judicial manipulation of statutes in the name of con-
stitutional avoidance.
Perhaps for this reason, the vitality of the Clear Affirmative Inten-
tion Canon has waned in the Supreme Court. Since Catholic Bishop,
the Supreme Court's rare allusions to the Clear Affirmative Intention
Canon are vague and do not cite Catholic Bishop's requirement of an
"affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. 99 Although
the Clear Affirmative Intention Canon's usage by the Supreme Court
has faded, its lessons are instructive. Ifjudicial efforts to avoid consti-
tutional issues are to be constrained by statutory text, the trigger for
the avoidance canon should not be some perceived ambiguity in a
statute. Similarly, courts must carefully calibrate the level of constitu-
tional misgivings necessary to warrant deviation from the otherwise-
96 Id. at 510-11.
97 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal.,
508 U.S. 602, 630 (1993) (invoking the Clear Affirmative Intention Canon, concluding
that "[i]n these circumstances it is enough that the choice to attain coherence by obviat-
ing constitutional problems is not 'plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"' (quoting
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988))).
99 In post-Catholic Bishop avoidance canon cases, the Supreme Court has only twice spoken
in terms of clear expressions of Congress's affirmative intent. In both cases, the Court
subtly shifted away from Catholic Bishop's language. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299
(2001) ("First, as a general matter, when a particular interpretation of a statute invokes
the outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended
that result." (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. at 568, 575 (1988))); see also DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575, 583-84
("invo[king] the Catholic Bishop rule," yet only citing Catholic Bishop for the proposition
that the avoidance canon will be used "unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress" (citing Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 499-501)). But the constitutional
avoidance principles of the Clear Affirmative Intention Canon do appear to linger in the
Court's discussion of other clear statement rules. See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 192 (2003) ("In short, the concept of express advocacy and the
concomitant class of magic words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional infirmi-
ties." (citing Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 500)).
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preferred reading of a statute. If the Clear Affirmative Intention
Canon exhibits both of these failings, the Lowest Common Denomi-
nator Canon does so in even more pronounced ways.
C. The Lowest Common Denominator Canon
1. Background on the Lowest Common Denominator Canon
The story behind the Lowest Common Denominator Canon be-
gins not in Clark v. Martinez,'00 but in an earlier case, Zadvydas v.
Davis.'0 ' In Zadvydas, the Court interpreted an immigration removal
statute. If the government failed to remove an alien within a ninety-
day removal period, the statute allows that the alien "may be detained
beyond the removal period ....
The precise issue in Zadvydas was whether to read in an implied
restriction that would limit post-removal detention to only a reason-
able period.'00 Concluding that indefinite detention of the petition-
ers-admitted, but removable aliens-would "raise a serious constitu-
tional problem" under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
the Court did read in a reasonableness limitation.
0 4
Although the immigrants in Zadvydas were admitted aliens, the
immigrants in Martinez were not. 15 The Martinez dissenters thought
that immigrants "who have not yet gained initial admission to this
country... would present a very different question." 1 6 Justice Scalia
conceded that "[i t is indeed different from the question decided in
Zadvydas, but because the statutory text provides for no distinction
between admitted and nonadmitted aliens, we find that it results in
the same answer." '° Thus, despite the lack of serious constitutional
doubts with respect to indefinite detention of not-yet-admitted aliens,
the statute's implicit reasonableness limitation applied to both
groups. Zadvydas, then, had already considered the "lowest common
denominator," but Martinez was bound by the same result. 10
8
100 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
101 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
102 Id. at 682 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103 See id. ("[W]e must decide whether this post-removal-period statute authorized the Attor-
ney General to detain a removable alien indefinitely beyond the removal period or only for
a period reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal.").
104 Id. at 689.
105 See Martinez, 543 U.S. at 373.
106 Id. at 388 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 Id. at 379 (majority opinion).
108 Id. at 380.
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But instead of relying solely on the Zadvydas precedent, Justice
Scalia supported his reading of the immigration statute by ushering
in the heretofore-unarticulated Lowest Common Denominator
Canon:
"[W] hen deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions
to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its
choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional
problems, the other should prevail-whether or not those consti-
tutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before the
Court." 0
Justice Scalia explained that the Lowest Common Denominator
Canon acts primarily as a tool for resolving textual ambiguity by not-
ing that "[t]he canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play
only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the stat-
ute is found to be susceptible of more than one construction; and the
canon functions as a means of choosing between them."" 0 When making
this choice, courts must be sensitive to "serious constitutional
doubts""' in choosing "between competing plausible interpretations
of a statutory text.. ." The rationale behind addressing the po-
tential constitutional doubts a statute might create-even if these
doubts do not apply in the instant case-is to forestall "the dangerous
principle that judges can give the same statutory text different mean-
ings in different cases."
'
1
13
Ultimately, the Lowest Common Denominator Canon breaks
down into the following questions:
(1) Is the statute ambiguous? If the statute is unambiguous, then
a court must address the merits of whatever constitutional
problems the statute presents.
(2) If the statute is ambiguous, what are the "competing plausible
interpretations" of the statute?
(3) For each "plausible" interpretation of the statute, determine
whether the interpretation presents "serious constitutional
doubts" when applied to all possible litigants. If one "plausi-
ble" interpretation raises "serious constitutional doubts" when
applied to some potential litigants, and another "plausible"
interpretation raises no such doubts with respect to any po-
109 Id. at 380-81.
110 Id. at 385 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1998) and
United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
IIl Id. at 381-82 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) and Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1998)).
112 Id. at 381.
113 Id. at 386.
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tential litigants, then a court should adopt the latter interpre-
tation for all applications of the statute.
These questions reveal that Question (3) of the Lowest Common De-
nominator Canon injects an extra complication for a judge attempt-
ing to use it; unlike the Serious Constitutional Doubts and Clear Af-
firmative Intention Canons, the Lowest Common Denominator
Canon requires an assessment of constitutional doubts posed by liti-
gants not before the court at all.
This added complication is significant, even though the Lowest
Common Denominator Canon otherwise shares notable similiarities
with the Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon. Both require "serious
constitutional doubts,"'1 4 not mere "serious constitutional ques-
tions."1 5 Similarly, the Lowest Common Denominator Canon's limi-
tation of "plausible" alternative readings seems to parallel the Serious
Constitutional Doubts Canon's "fairly possible" interpretations re-
quirement."6 But even though these limitations ensure that the Seri-
ous Constitutional Doubts Canon is less susceptible to judicial ma-
nipulation than is the Clear Affirmative Intention Canon, 117 they
nonetheless fail to insulate the Lowest Common Denominator Canon
from judicial manipulation.
2. The Lowest Common Denominator Canon in Action
The Lowest Common Denominator's susceptibility to judicial ma-
nipulation arises principally because it incorporates the Clear Af-
firmative Intention Canon's same flaw: the "triggers" for both are
rooted in a statute's perceived lack of clarity, not in the seriousness of
doubts inherent in the preferred interpretation of the statute.
This triggering effect arises in the earlier-discussed hypothetical
congressional statute:
The federal government's termination of an employee of an
agency is unlawful, unless:
(1) the employee has been convicted of a felony; or
(2) because of the employee's sexual orientation, termination is
determined to be advisable in the interests of the United
States.
114 See supra Part I1A.1. and text accompanying note 111.
115 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
116 See supra text accompanying note 3 and Part II.A.2.
117 See supra Part II.B.
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Jones and a hypothetical litigant, Smith, were unpaid college interns
working for the State Department, wishing to challenge their termi-
nations under the statute. Jones is terminated after a felony convic-
tion, but Smith is terminated after the State Department concludes
that his homosexuality poses a threat to national security.
This statute illustrates how the Serious Constitutional Doubts and
Lowest Common Denominator Canons function as drastically differ-
ent interpretive methods. Under the Serious Constitutional Doubts
Canon, Jones's case is easy; Jones certainly falls within the ambit of
the preferred reading of the statute, and his termination is constitu-
tionally uncontroversial. A straightforward application of the Serious
Constitutional Doubts Canon is consistent with Congress's likely in-
tention forJones to be terminable.
But under the Lowest Common Denominator Canon, Jones's case
becomes dramatically more difficult. This is because the Lowest
Common Denominator Canon is styled as a tool for resolving statu-
tory ambiguity whenever the ambiguity arises in a statute the applica-
tion of which could be unconstitutional as to some possible litigants.
Jones can therefore proceed simply by pointing out the ambiguity in
the statute-for example, the term "employee" has many defini-
tions 8-forcing a court to break the tie by using the Lowest Com-
mon Denominator Canon."" To resolve this statutory ambiguity, a
court would therefore have to examine whether the statute's applica-
tion to other hypothetical litigants raises "serious constitutional
doubts," making that application the "lowest common denomina-
tor." 
120
Thus, Smith, the hypothetical litigant, now influences judicial in-
terpretation of the statute. Because Smith's termination likely pre-
sents serious constitutional doubts, a court applying the Lowest
Common Denominator Canon would interpret the term "employee"
narrowly in order to exclude unpaid college interns such as Smith.'2
118 In fact, much commentary has focused on the definition of "employee." See generally
Mathew G. Simon, Not All Illnesses Are Treated Equally-Does a Disability Benefits Plan Violate
the ADA by Providing Less Generous Long-Term Benefits for Mentally Disabled Employees than for
Physically Disabled Employees?, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 943, 946-58 (2006) (comparing
various courts' definitions of "employee" under Titles I and VII of the Americans With
Disabilities Act).
119 See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
120 SeeJonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 84 TEx. L. REV. 339, 339 (2005) (describing the Lowest Common Denominator
Canon as a "particular textualist rule of statutory construction... so strong that it must
always apply; courts lack power to deviate from it").
121 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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This example demonstrates that for any statute of the form, "X is law-
ful only if A or B," the Lowest Common Denominator Canon allows
for deviation from a preferred interpretation of the statute, even
though the statute is plainly constitutional as applied to one of the
two alternatives, A or B.
3. Judicial Manipulation and the Costs and Benefits of the Lowest
Common Denominator Canon
The Jones and Smith example tests our intuitions about the desir-
ability of interpreting one litigant, who poses no constitutional prob-
lems, out of a statute just because of the constitutional problems
posed by another hypothetical litigant. But some might say that this
example simply begs the question; even if the adoption of a saving
construction appears undesirable in this instance, perhaps the Lowest
Common Denominator Canon has other benefits that outweigh its
costs. This is wrong.
The principal benefit of the Lowest Common Denominator
Canon-uniformity of statutory interpretation-is exaggerated. Ini-
tially, Justice Scalia makes a compelling case for the canon, arguing
that it is necessary to avoid "render[ing] every statute a chameleon,
its meaning subject to change depending on the presence or absence
of constitutional concerns in each individual case."122
But on closer examination, the need for interpretive uniformity is
hardly evident. For example, the Court has interpreted 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983's provision, "[e]very person who, under color of any stat-
ute," 12' differently depending on the context. Thus, state officers act-
ing in an official capacity are not "persons" under § 1983 when being
sued for money damages, yet are "persons" when sued for injunctive
relief.12 4 The same is true in everyday language; the same word in a
given sentence does not always have to have a single definition (e.g.,
"Melissa left the party in tears and a Ford Pinto."). Thus, interpretive
uniformity, though apparently desirable, turns out not to be a neces-
sity.
But even if interpretive uniformity is always desirable, it comes
with significant costs under the Lowest Common Denominator
Canon. These highly related costs, which I address in turn, are: (1)
122 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005).
123 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
124 See Siegel, supra note 120, at 361 (discussing Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S.
58 (1989)).
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facilitation of judicial manipulation of statutes; (2) the sheer diffi-
culty of using the Lowest Common Denominator Canon; and (3)
separation-of-powers harms.
The first and most significant cost of the Lowest Common De-
nominator Canon is the potential for unnecessary deviation from the
preferred reading of a statute. This results from the key difference
between the Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon and the Lowest
Common Denominator Canon: If the otherwise-preferred reading of
a statute does not raise "serious constitutional doubts" when applied
to a litigant, only under the Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon
does this finding end the issue. But under the Lowest Common De-
nominator Canon, the ambiguity of the statute simply triggers further
examination into whether the statute's application to hypothetical
litigants raises serious constitutional doubts. As the Jones and Smith
example shows, this further examination is the gateway to potential
departure from the natural reading of the statute.
In this respect, the Lowest Common Denominator Canon repli-
cates the main failing of the Clear Affirmative Intention Canon: just
as few statutes exhibit a clear intent to implicate constitutional is-
sues, 125 few statutes are truly unambiguous. And judges may always
argue that a statute is ambiguous, as statutes are subject to the inher-
ent limitations of language.116 Thus, the Lowest Common Denomina-
tor Canon's main failing is that every statute is potentially subject to
judicial manipulation.
In addition to the triggering effect of statutory ambiguity, the
Canon's other interpretive difficulties impede its usefulness to judges.
For one thing, application of the Lowest Common Denominator
Canon never actually requires a judge to determine what the natural
reading of a statute is; a judge's use of "ordinary textual analysis"
need only extend far enough to show that the statute is "susceptible
of more than one construction."'12 7 After that, all "competing plausi-
ble interpretations"' 128 of a statute stand in equipoise, paving the way
for the Lowest Common Denominator Canon's usage. Thus, the
125 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that because of
language's inherent "open-textured" quality, "[c]anons of 'interpretation' cannot elimi-
nate, though they can diminish, these uncertainties; for these canons are themselves gen-
eral rules for the use of language, and make use of general terms which themselves re-
quire interpretation").
127 Martinez, 543 U.S. at 384.
128 Id. at 381.
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Canon does not rely on the primacy of the preferred interpretation
of a statute.
Ignoring the primacy of the preferred interpretation has conse-
quences. No longer anchored to the preferred interpretation as a
reference point for their analysis, judges must instead conceptualize
all constitutional challenges posed by all potential applications of all
"plausible" interpretations of a statute. This requires judges to have
vivid, yet accurate, imaginations, since a judge confronted with
Jones's case must conceive of Smith's case, regardless of whether
Smith is a litigant or not. It is easier for a judge to interpret the stat-
ute in light of Smith's case, if Smith happens to be the first litigant. 129
These difficulties strongly resemble the difficulties that plague
broad facial challenges. Comparative institutional competence, for
example, is one of the main arguments advanced against broad facial
challenges. Congress and the President have comparably greater ex-
pertise in evaluating the constitutionality of a particular item of legis-
lation and "may well support a bill that has numerous constitutional
applications, even if they can imagine unconstitutional applications,
and surely may support a bill even though they acknowledge that it
might have as-yet-unimagined unconstitutional applications."13
0
Courts, on the other hand, "specialize in unbundling. It is precisely
where their comparative competence lies. They do not vote on, sign,
or veto a bill as a whole, but rather enter judgments resolving indi-
vidual cases." 13' By requiring judges to consider as-yet-unimagined
unconstitutional applications, the Lowest Common Denominator
Canon also reaches beyond the judiciary's comparative competence
in resolving individual cases. The sheer difficulty of using the Canon
impedes its usefulness and, in so doing, upsets the separation-of-
powers balance among the three branches of government.
Furthermore, other separation-of-powers costs derive from the
Lowest Common Denominator Canon. In addition to placing the ju-
diciary outside its area of institutional competence, the Canon also
129 One potential rationale behind the Lowest Common Denominator Canon is to reduce
the extent to which the order of litigants determines how a statute is interpreted. See The
Supreme Court-Leading Cases: Canon of Avoidance, 119 HARV. L. REV. 386, 393 & n.60
(2005). Although the Lowest Common Denominator Canon does appear to reduce the
effect of the order of litigated cases, this effect is still present.
130 Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and
the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. Rav. 1735, 1746 (2006). But for a contrast-
ing view arguing that judicial rulemaking would be better served by not having to decide
individual cases, see generally, for example, Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?,
73 U. CHI. L. REv. 883 (2006).
131 Hartnett, supra note 130, at 1746.
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disrupts the role that the executive branch plays in the process of
constitutional avoidance 11 and statutory interpretation generally. 33
These possibilities occur even in the Jones and Smith example, if, for
instance, the State Department announces a policy not to use its
statutory authority to terminate gays. Executive branch enforcement,
or lack thereof, creates the distinct possibility that one interpreta-
tion's serious constitutional doubts might never materialize for some
potential litigants.
What the courts should do in cases of possible executive underen-
forcement is far from clear. At a minimum, these considerations im-
plicate other separation-of-powers doctrines, such as justiciability doc-
trines (e.g., ripeness) and even the avoidance canon itself, both of
which seek to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication.
The Lowest Common Denominator Canon's combination of po-
tential judicial manipulation, interpretive difficulty, and separation-
of-powers problems create another conceptual problem: they cumu-
latively undermine justifications unique to the Lowest Common De-
nominator Canon. Recall that, in general, the avoidance canon'sjus-
tifications lie in judicial restraint 3 4 and constitutional enforcement
values. 3 5  The latter evolved to defend the avoidance canon against
allegations that it allows courts to deviate from congressional in-
tent. 136
But when Justice Scalia labeled the Lowest Common Denominator
Canon a tool for resolving textual ambiguity,1 7 he limited this par-
ticular Canon to only textualist and judicial restraint justifications.
The Court confirmed as much in Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line
Ltd. 3 when it distinguished clear statement rules' 9 from the Lowest
132 See generally Morrison, supra note 24 (discussing theories that inform the executive
branch's use of the avoidance canon).
133 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (setting forth the now-infamous Chevron deference framework).
134 See supra text accompanying notes 25-33.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
136 See Morrison, supra note 24, at 1212-13 ("First, if the aim of avoidance is to protect consti-
tutional values by effectively 'rais[ing] the cost of any congressional encroachment within
a particular area of constitutional sensitivity,' then its failure to track congressional intent
is largely irrelevant." (alteration in original)); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Can-
ons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 338 (2000) (describing the avoidance canon as one of several
"nondelegation principles... designed to ensure that Congress decides certain contested
questions on its own").
137 See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
138 545 U.S. 119 (2005) (plurality opinion).
139 For a discussion of the similarities between the avoidance canon and clear statement
rules, see Morrison, supra note 24, at 1213-16. A commonly recognized distinction be-
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Common Denominator Canon. The Court noted that the latter
"gives full respect to the distinction between rules for resolving tex-
tual ambiguity and implied limitations on otherwise unambiguous
text."140 This distinction helps explain why the Lowest Common De-
nominator Canon has been described as a "particular textualist rule
of statutory construction... so strong that it must always apply; courts
lack power to deviate from it.'' 4. Part of textualism's appeal relates to
separation-of-powers considerations, for it apparently reduces the
type of judicial discretion that leads to "creative" readings of stat-
utes. 142 As a tool for resolving textual ambiguity, the Lowest Common
Denominator Canon embraces similar judicial restraint underpin-
nings. 143
When judged solely in terms of judicial restraint values, however,
the game of using the Lowest Common Denominator Canon is not
worth the candle. The Canon creates difficult decisions for judges,
who may stray from the preferred reading of a statute out of laziness,
out of willfulness, or even despite best efforts. These problems are
magnified, since the Lowest Common Denominator Canon acts "to
raise the stakes as to the initial judicial choice,"' 4 binding later courts
who consider other applications of the same statute. 145  And every
statute, potentially fraught with perceived ambiguity, is susceptible to
this treatment.
III. AVOIDING THE AVOIDANCE CANON IN THE LOWER COURTS
Although the Lowest Common Denominator Canon is flawed on
its own terms, the Canon's most serious flaw is how it piles onto the
tween the avoidance canon and clear statement rules is that, in the latter case, Congress's
use of legislative authority is concededly constitutional. However, courts impose on Con-
gress the burden of additional deliberation when deciding to encroach on constitutional
values, such as federalism. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION, supra note 13, at
355-56.
140 Spector, 545 U.S. at 140.
141 Siegel, supra note 120, at 339.
142 See generally Nelson, supra note 17, at 374-403 (explaining textualist rationales for prefer-
ring relatively rule-like approaches to statutory interpretation).
143 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005) (arguing that the Lowest Common Denomi-
nator Canon "is thus a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting
it," so that "when a litigant invokes the canon of avoidance, he is not attempting to vindi-
cate the constitutional rights of others.., he seeks to vindicate his own statutory rights").
144 Siegel, supra note 120, at 377.
145 See id. at 379 (arguing that judges can bind later courts, simply by allowing unworthy,
ideological reasons to permeate their decision making at an earlier stage of the interpre-
tive process).
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preexisting landscape of avoidance canon confusion in the lower
courts. Before the Lowest Common Denominator Canon ever came
along, the avoidance canon was already a pastiche of similar-sounding
yet ultimately discordant language.
This cacophony emerged when the Supreme Court quietly
morphed the canon into two wholly different versions, the Serious
Constitutional Doubts Canon and the Clear Affirmative Intention
Canon. Even though the Clear Affirmative Intention Canon has had
declining usage in the Supreme Court,146 references to it persist in
the lower courts.
The ready availability of both canons, however, is problematic.
Whenever lower courts confront statutory interpretation issues where
some level of constitutional doubts may be in play, the two canons of-
ten support different results.
Thus, when courts do not wish to invoke the avoidance canon,
they cite the language of the Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon.
Lower courts often mention that they must seriously "doubt" the con-
stitutionality of the statute-not merely have "questions"-in order to
depart from a statute's natural reading.147  That said, despite the Su-
preme Court's grudging refusal in notable cases to characterize con-
stitutional doubts as serious, 14 lower courts do sometimes find consti-
tutional doubts serious enough to warrant saving constructions. 149
146 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
147 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding that the ap-
pellant's constitutional objections were not "so powerful as to require us to abandon" the
challenged interpretation of the statute), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 925 (2004); Artichoke Joe's
Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 731 (9th Cir. 2003) ("As the Supreme Court
has cautioned elsewhere, '[s] tatutes should be interpreted to avoid serious constitutional
doubts, not to eliminate all possible contentions that the statute might be unconstitu-
tional.' Thus, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance does not apply here." (alteration
in original) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 314 n.9 (1992))), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
815 (2004); Am. Fed'n of Gov't. Employees v. United States, 330 F.3d 513, 519 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (cautioning that "Judge Friendly's formulation captures an important qualification
to the saving-construction doctrine-namely, that the constitutional doubt must be
'real'"), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1088 (2003); United States v. Garfinkel, 29 F.3d 451, 455
(8th Cir. 1994) ("Well aware that federal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid seri-
ous doubt of their constitutionality, we nevertheless will not ignore the legislative will in
order to avoid constitutional adjudication." (citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
148 See supra Part II.A. 1.
149 See, e.g., Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 998, 1000-03 (9th Cir. 2000) (adopting a
saving construction of part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, despite explicitly recog-
nizing that the Serious Constitutional Doubts Canon requires that "avoidance of a diffi-
culty will not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion"); see also Waterview Mgmt.
Co. v. FDIC, 105 F.3d 696, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (invoking the Serious Constitutional
Doubts Canon as a basis for adopting an alternate construction of a statute); United
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An even-more-popular tactic for courts seeking to invoke the
avoidance canon is just to resort to the language of the Clear Affirma-
tive Intention Canon. Courts employing this Canon do not hesitate
to note that mere constitutional "problems"'1 50 or "questions" '151 are
present. And these courts also note the apparent necessity of alter-
nate statutory readings, absent Congress's "clear" intent to implicate
constitutional issues. 15
2
Now, there are three avoidance canons, and all three are techni-
cally good law. But instead of cabining lower courts' ability to ma-
nipulate conflicting descriptions of the avoidance canon, the Lowest
Common Denominator Canon has added to the confusion. Lower
courts are confused by, on one hand, the broad applicability of the
Lowest Common Denominator Canon, and on the other hand, the
Court's sharp distinction between clear statement rules and the
Canon as simply a tool for resolving textual ambiguity. '53
States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 1992) ("We avoid construing the guide-
line as the government suggests because, as [defendant] notes, there is serious doubt as
to whether the guideline, when so construed, satisfies the requirements of due process.").
150 See, e.g., James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 695 (6th Cir. 2002) (interpreting a stat-
ute to avoid "significant constitutional problems" (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi.,
440 U.S. 490 (1979))); see also Gray-Bey v. United States, 201 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2000)
(characterizing the Catholic Bishop rule as mandating avoidance of "constitutional prob-
lems").
151 See, e.g., Neal v. Bd. of Trustees of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 772 (9th Cir. 1999) (re-
jecting a district court's interpretation of Title IX on the grounds that the suggested in-
terpretation of the statute did not "raise[] serious constitutional questions" (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); see also Comet Enter. Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane Corp., 128 F.3d 855, 859
(4th Cir. 1997) ("A court is always well advised to construe regulations in a manner that
avoids such 'serious constitutional questions."' (citing Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 500-
01)); U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 114 F.3d 1564, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Mayer,J.,
dissenting) ("Indeed, courts must strive to avoid constitutional questions." (citing Catholic
Bishop, 440 U.S. at 500-01)).
152 See, e.g., Geary v. Visitation of Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir.
1993) (describing Catholic Bishop as inquiring, "is there a permissible construction of the
statute that avoids that risk, or alternatively, is there a clear expression that Congress in-
tended that the statute apply?"); see also United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 903 (3d Cir.
1987) (noting, in the context of a congressional attempt to bar evidence of mental ab-
normality from the issue of mens rea, that "[t]he constitutional issues are sufficiently sub-
stantial, [but] we are unwilling to create a rule of evidence that would raise them in the
absence of explicit Congressional direction." (citing Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501)).
153 Compare Kelava v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2006) (reading the Court's dis-
tinction between clear statement rules and the avoidance canon in Spector v. Norwegian
Cruise Line Ltd., 540 U.S. 119 (2005), as a limitation of Martinez), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
43 (2006), with Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 325 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to read Spec-
tor as a limitation of Martinez, because Spector is limited only to traditionally sensitive areas,
such as federalism). But some courts are now beginning to view the Lowest Common
Denominator Canon as a tool for resolving statutory ambiguity. See, e.g., Price v. Time,
Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1342 (11 th Cir. 2005) ("Courts employ the canon of constitutional
[Vol. 10:1
A VOIDANCE CANONS AFTER CLARK V. MARTINEZ
This initial conceptual confusion extends to confusion about the
application of the Lowest Common Denominator Canon. Post-
Martinez cases invoking the avoidance canon have clashed over
whether a statute was ambiguous, without even citing Martinez at all. 154
Most of all, post-Martinez cases have ignored the "lowest common de-
nominator" aspect of this Canon; none have yet attempted to exam-
ine a statute's potential constitutional problems through the prism of
hypothetical litigants.
155
To some, lower courts' disregard of the "lowest common denomi-
nator" aspect of this Canon is not a cause for concern. If courts do
not resort to interpreting statutes through the prism of hypothetical
litigants, then wholesale judicial dismemberment of statutes remains
only a theoretical possibility. But if pre-Martinez history is any indica-
tion, conflicting formulations of the avoidance canon eventually end
up as ammunition, deployed in wars over statutory interpretation.
The Lowest Common Denominator Canon changes none of this and,
instead, lurks as a potentially devastating weapon for turning once-
easy cases into hard ones.
CONCLUSION
The three-headed hydra of avoidance canons is a far cry from the
avoidance canon Justice Brandeis set forth in Ashwander. Like all
avoidance as 'a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statu-
tory text.' . . . Courts do not use this tool when the text of the statute is unambiguous."
(citing Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 n.5 (2005))).
154 CompareJohnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1229-30 (l1th Cir. 2005) (invoking
the avoidance canon to adopt an alternate reading of the Voting Rights Act without citing
Martinez), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 650 (2005), with id. at 1240 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the majority's use of the avoidance canon was improper because "there is no am-
biguity," and because "the 'avoidance' doctrine should not be employed as a pretext for
rewriting clear statutory language").
155 See, e.g., Davet v. City of Cleveland, 456 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing the
avoidance canon and Martinez, yet failing to mention the "lowest common denomina-
tor"); Price, 416 F.3d at 1342 (same); Mgmt. Ass'n for Private Programmetric Surveyors v.
United States, 467 F. Supp. 2d 596, 603 n.9 (E.D. Va. 2006) (discussing Martinez, yet refus-
ing to consider hypothetical challenges to potential interpretations of a statute, reasoning
that "there is no difficult constitutional issue to avoid"); V.I. Auto. Rental Ass'n v. V.I. Port
Auth., No. 2001-130, 2006 WL 1875893, at *5 (D.V.1.June 30, 2006) ("Because this matter
is decided on the language of the statute, this Court need not address... constitutional
arguments." (citing Martinez, 543 U.S. at 381-82)); cf AARP v. EEOC, 390 F. Supp. 2d
437, 454 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (using the avoidance canon to reject the EEOC's interpretation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act because it would have created serious con-
stitutional doubts concerning the nondelegation doctrine (citing Martinez, 543 U.S. at
371)).
Dec. 2007]
224 JOURNAL OF CONSTIFUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 10:1
canons of statutory construction, the avoidance canon is supposed to
provide stability and guidance. The added difficulty of the avoidance
canon derives from separation-of-powers issues. Judges must properly
balance respect for the legislative process as a whole, respect for any
individual statute's expression of legislative intent, and respect for the
sensitivity of constitutional adjudication and, some would say, en-
forcement.
But if judicial restraint is all that matters, the Lowest Common
Denominator Canon fails, creating confusion in its wake. Its failure
confirms the following unusual result: even in some apparently easy
cases, for any given use of the avoidance canon, another use of the
avoidance canon might very well point in the opposite direction.
